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Despite the Second Circuit's recent admonition that attempting to apply
traditional trademark law principles to the rapidly developing online world is
"like trying to board a moving bus,' the federal district courts have wasted
no time adjudicating disputes over ownership of Internet domain names.-
While judges are often called upon to decide cases involving highly technical
fields in which they possess little or no knowledge or experience," rarely have
they been asked to venture into "uncharted territory" amidst such widespread
pressure from politicians, multinational corporations, and private citizens.'
This Case Note argues that by manipulating and finessing traditional
trademark principles to fit Internet disputes, as was done in Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci,5 courts are likely to
misallocate the "costs of confusion" incurred by users surfing the World Wide
Web.6 Judges should instead recognize the effect that newly refined legal
doctrines will inevitably have on the development of Internet technologies. In
doing so, they will appreciate the potential for private, industry-oriented
solutions.7 Judicial myopia of the type displayed in Bucci threatens to hinder
the Internet's vigorous potential for growth.
I. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir 1997).
2. See, e.g., Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co.. No. 96-8377 MRP IRC). 1997
WL 405898 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 1997); Panavision Int'l. L.P. v Toeppen. 945 F Supp 1296 (C D Cal
1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D Mo. 1996)h MTV Networks. Inc % Curry.
867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Domain names are mnemonic. alphanumenc. uscr-fnendly altcmati.es
to the numeric Intemet protocol (IP) addresses by which computers refer to one another A fully qualified
domain consists of three parts, delimited by periods: from right to left. the top-lesl domain (c g ."" coin"),
the second-level domain (e.g., "'plannedparenthood"). and the name of the individual ser-er ie g. -%% %W**)
See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227. 1230-31 (ND 111. 1996). Kenneth Sutherhn Ducker.
Note, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark Protection for Internet Domain .Vanes, 9 lARM J L
& TECH. 483, 492-97 (1996).
3. See Williams v. Commissioner. 256 F.2d 217. 219-20 (9th Cir 1958)
4. Byron F. Marchant, On-Line on tie iternet: First Amendment and Intellectual Properri
Uncertainties in the On-Line World. 39 How. L.J. 477, 478 (1996)
5. No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313 (S.DN Y Mar 24. 1997)
6. Cf Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co.. 34 F3d 1340. 1355 (7th Cir 1994) (Cudah). J.
dissenting) ("[T]he underlying purpose of the Lanham Act is consumer protection, and the damages
measure is an effort to estimate the *cost' of the confusion that would be created [b) products competing
in the marketplace using confusingly similar marks].").
7. Cf Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329. 2354 (1997) (O'Connor. J . concumng ii the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (discussing the potential development of "'screening" softws are designed to present
minors from accessing online pornography).
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Bucci arose after Planned Parenthood discovered that a radio talk show
host had been using "plannedparenthood.com" as the address for a Web site
promoting an anti-abortion book. The site greeted users with the message
"Welcome to the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE" displayed across
the top of the screen.8 Though the parties disputed the defendant's motive in
selecting Planned Parenthood's registered mark as its domain name, some
"'unwitting users of the Internet' 9 were duped into believing that the
defendant's site was Planned Parenthood's actual home page." Its official
Web site, however, had been located at "ppfa.org" since 1994."
Employing long-established Lanham Act principles, 2 Judge Wood found
that Bucci had infringed the plaintiff's mark.' 3 In reaching this conclusion,
she made findings about "the nature of domain names and home page
addresses,"'14 and found Bucci liable based on the "likelihood of confusion"
his site had engendered. First, because ".com" is a popular designation for
domain names, the court found that an Internet user is "likely to assume that
'.com' after a corporation's name will bring her to that corporation's home
page."' 5 Second, Internet users face temporary delays between the time they
type a domain name into their browsers and the time they actually get to view
the page, and again each time they follow a link to retrieve more information
about the site.' 6 According to the court, these "lengthy" delays between an
attempt to access a page and the realization that one has specified the wrong
8. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *1.
9. Id. at *2 (quoting Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum at 2).
10. See id. at *8.
II. As of November 1997, Planned Parenthood no longer uses either "plannedparenthood.com" or
"ppfa.org" as its home page. Its official Web site is currently located at "plannedparenthood.org." See
Welcome to Planned Parenthood (visited Nov. 7, 1997) <http://www.plannedparenthood.org>. Neither
"plannedparenthood.com" nor "ppfa.org" provides any sort of notice or link to the official site.
12. The Lanham Act is the federal trademark infringement statute. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
13. Unlike courts in other domain name cases that more closely resembled conventional trademark
disputes, the court had difficulty fitting the statutory requirements to the facts. For example, the court
finessed the issue of federal jurisdiction. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (requiring that the unauthorized use of a
trademark be "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of any good or
services" in order to constitute infringement). The court held that promoting (yet not selling) a book, fund-
raising (though not online), and criticizing the plaintiff's activities (even though typically protected under
the First Amendment) combined to bring Bucci's activities under the purview of federal law. See Bucci,
1997 WL 133313, at *4.
14. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *8.
15. Id. Judge Wood found that many of the visitors to Bucci's Web site ceased searching for the
official Planned Parenthood Web site "due to anger, frustration, or the belief that plaintiff's home page does
not exist." Id. at *4. Yet the fact that Planned Parenthood's Web site was located at "ppfa.org" and not
"plannedparenthood.com" was the decision of the plaintiff, not the defendant. Thus users would have failed
to reach "ppfa.org" even were there no content at "plannedparenthood.com." Furthermore, the fact that
users were angered or frustrated by their reaction to the site's content should be irrelevant, given Bucci's
First Amendment right to "induce[] a condition of unrest, create[] dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stir[] people to anger." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 4 (1949).
16. See Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *8.
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address raise the possibility of user confusion.'7 Finally, in gauging the
sophistication of Internet users, the court determined that some "may not be
so immediately perspicacious" as to recognize their failure to reach their
intended destination.t" Based on these factors, the court found a likelihood of
confusion sufficient to enjoin Bucci's use of the domain.
The holding in Bucci is arguably in conflict with applicable precedent from
cases involving traditional communications media. By assuming that Internet
users are naive, credulous, and unable to recognize the "historic enmity"
between pro-life and pro-choice forces, the opinion suggests the judiciary
should hold them to an extremely low standard of sophistication, particularly
in comparison to the level expected of those who rely on conventional
media.' 9 More importantly for the purposes of this Case Note, however, the
decision conflicts with the fundamental purpose of trademark law.
II
Trademark law is designed to protect the interests of consumers by
denoting the sources of particular goods and services. Trademarks simplify the
process through which consumers acquire product information, thus lowering
the "search costs" '20 involved in distinguishing among different sellers and
differentiating among goods the consumers may never have seen before.2 ' By
relying on trademarks to signal various product characteristics, the consumer
need not scrutinize each individual good every time he or she makes a
purchase. Moreover, since consumers benefit from lower search costs, sellers
can capture some of this surplus by charging higher prices.' Confusion in the
marketplace, however, eliminates these economic gains, for when trademarks
17. Although the court never articulated exactly hw thie delays exacerbate the likelihood of confusion.
it implied that the confusion arises from extending the penod during sshich the Internet user cannot
absolutely determine the source behind the content of a Web site See id. at *8
18. Id. at *9.
19. Compare the court's reasoning with International Ass 'n of Aachiists % 1inship Greets Nirstni:
Center, 103 F.3d 196, 198-99 (Ist Cir. 1996). in which the First Circuit refused to find likelihood of
confusion where Winship's management had attempted to influence a union election by distributing
propaganda purportedly written on union letterhead. The fake letters and insoices, complete %%Ith
reproductions of IAM's service mark. had been intended to inform users of the potential negative effect.
of unionization. IAM alleged infringement, but the First Circuit found that the **historic enmity** betsccn
labor and management had "inevitably conditioned voters to view with suspicion an) claims made by either
party about the other" and that voters were therefore readily able to identify Winship as the actual source
of the materials. Id. at 207. Any voter "'of ordinary prudence and normal intelligence" would have
recognized the prank, id. at 205, and though the more unsophisticated may have been a bit perplexed.
confusion resulting from, consumers' -'carelessness. indifference. or ennui [uould] not suffice." id at 201
Despite analogous facts, the Bucci court refused to give Web surfers the same credit the First Circuit
imputed to Winship's employees. See Bucci. 1997 WL 133313. at "9
20. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J PoL Eco\ 213. 219 (19611
21. See Peter E. Mims, Note, Promotional Goods and the Functionalht) Doctrine An Economic Model
of Trademarks, 63 TEx. L. REv. 639, 658 n.102 (1984).
22. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner. Trademark law"- An Economw Perspective. 30 J L
& EcON. 265, 269-70 (1987).
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convey misinformation, consumers' search costs rise substantially. Thus the
benefits that trademarks generate relate to the efficiency of the marketplace and
consumers' ability to find what they are looking for.
Domain names were intended to offer a user-friendly means by which to
identify and locate particular Internet sites. 3 Many commentators have
debated whether domain names serve the trademark function of identifying the
source of particular products or services.24 Yet the right question is not
whether domain names can perform this source-denoting function, but whether
they should play this role. 5 If the object of trademark law is to lower
consumers' search costs, courts should look to economic principles in order to
promote the development of a system that makes finding specific parties'
Internet sites easier, not more difficult. To apply these principles, however,
judges must first understand how users navigate through cyberspace.
There are three ways of searching for information on the Internet.26
Domain names are the first, however, as the facts of Bucci demonstrate, this
method involves significant guesswork and substantial risks of ending up at the
wrong site. 7 A user's second option is to engage one of many search engines
to find sites containing certain key words. Such searches, however, typically
overwhelm the novice user by generating hundreds or thousands of site
listings. 8 The third method involves searching through hierarchical indexes
such as Yahoo! ,29 in which headings and categories allow the user to pinpoint
the precise information he or she is seeking. Like their telephone counterparts,
these directories require significant investments of time and effort to collect
and organize the cornucopia of information available online.
The decision in Bucci legitimizes and encourages the first method at the
expense of the other two, even though the other methods, in particular the
23. Cf. Joshua Quitmer, Life in Cyberspace: You Deserve a Break Today, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7, 1994,
at A5 (describing domain names as being "like postal addresses, vanity license plates and billboards, all
rolled into one digital enchilada").
24. Compare Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging, Law of
Cybermarks, I RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 911 29-39 (Apr. 10, 1995) <http:llwww.richmond.edul-joltlvlil/
burk.html> (comparing domain names with geographic addresses, and suggesting that applying trademark
law to domain disputes may be "problematic"), with Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain
Name Corral: Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites,
58 U. Pt'r. L. REv. 911,951-53 (1997) (concluding that domain names serve a source-denoting function).
25. Judges need not automatically confer trademark protection simply because a mark exhibits source-
distinguishing ability. If there is a "special reason that convincingly militates against the use" of a particular
product characteristic as a trademark, protection may be unavailable. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). For instance, a distinctive color is not entitled to trademark protection if the
color serves to identify a particular type of medication, in addition to its source. See Inwood Labs., Inc.
v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 858 n.20 (1982), cited in Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 169.
26. See Kelly Kunsch, Diogenes Wanders the Superhighway: A ProposalforAuthentication of Publicly
Disseminated Documents on the Internet, 20 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 749, 758 n.43 (1997).
27. See Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *8.
28. For example, an Altavista search for "Planned Parenthood" turned up 18,543 documents. Search
of Altavista <http://altavista.digital.com> (Nov. 7, 1997).
29. Yahoo! (visited Nov. 7. 1997) <http://www.yahoo.com>.
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third, are comparatively more efficient.3" The court should have equated the
practice of guessing domain names with user carelessness"' and deemed it an
inefficient way to navigate the Internet. Such a ruling would allow Web site
operators to employ similar-sounding domain names, 2 which might eliminate
guesswork as an effective method of Internet searching. This in turn would
promote alternative technologies, such as more expansive and better
categorized directories, as well as techniques for Web site authentication.
III
There is certainly room for trademark law in resolving online trademark
disputes. The key, however, is identifying those situations in which traditional
trademark principles are applicable.33 When legal precedents do not fit the
30. Unlike other search methods. directories guarantee that the user %%ill reach his or her intended
location (so long as the site is properly indexed), though the joume) may require an extra click or tmo of
the mouse. As directories become more advanced, the comparatise efficiency of directones as opposed to
domain guessing will rise, perhaps enough to obviate domain guessing as a common nasigation strateg
31. Cf United States v. 88 Cases, More or Less. Containing Birele, 's Orange Be% erage. 187 F 2d 967.
971 (3d Cir. 1951) (explaining that Congress. in drafting the Lainham Act. "'contemplated the reaction of
the ordinary person who is neither savant nor dolt. land) %%ho exercises a normal measure of the
layman's common sense and judgment"). Guessing a company's domain name can be considered careless
in that it is somewhat like guessing a company's toll-free mnemonic telephone number (e g. surmising that
the number for Holiday Inns must be 1-800-HOLIDAY)
32. By refusing to allow the unauthorized use of an) domain name similar to Planned Parenthood's
mark, the court effectively reduced the number of available domain names Thus., %tile uaking Web
addresses easier to guess, the court limited other parties' opportunities to enjoy a distincttse web address
Because a domain name is an integral part of an Internet home page. reducing the number of a%ailable
domains has severe implications for certain forms of protected speech
For example, although the court rejected the defendant's claim that [is use %%as protected as a parody,
this case may affect the future of parody and satire online. Parody depends on creating a spark of confusion
in order to "convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-messages that it is the onginal. but also that
it is not the original and is instead a parody." Cliffs Notes. Inc. % Bantun Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group,
Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989). There is no parody exception to the Lanham Act per se. rather, a
parody defense is simply a rephrasing of the response that consumers are unlikely to be confused as to
source or sponsorship. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA. Inc. 109 F 3d 1394. 1405 t9th
Cir. 1997). If courts automatically assume a higher degree of confusion on the Internet based solely on
unauthorized use, this defense may become impossible to plead. See Jon H Oram. Will rite Real Candidate
Please Stand Up?: Political Parody on the Internet. 5 J l',TELL PROP L (forthcoming 19981
The decision may also have consequences for other forms of protected speech such as. for example,
the use of another's mark as part of a communicative message (e g. crittctsm. nesss reporting, or social
commentary). See, e.g., Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g. Inc. 809 F Supp 267. 276 (S D N Y
1992). In these instances, courts employ a balancing approach, weighing the likelihood of confusion against
the defendant's First Amendment interests. See Rogers % Gnmaldi. 875 F2d 994. 999 t2d Cir 1989) By
assuming a high likelihood of confusion, courts may implicitly tip the scales against free expression
33. Ira Nathenson has identified four categories of domain disputes squatters. tmins. parasites, and
poachers. See Nathenson, supra note 24. at 925-29. Each of these categories better resembles a traditional
trademark dispute, in which parties using similar marks compete in the same geographical area- Hence.
some cases are easier to decide than others, and for many, the traditional trademark cause of action still
fits well. For example, when two competitors seek the same domain name, it is only fair that the registered
trademark owner have access to its preferred address. See. e g . Juno Online Senr s, L P % Juno Lighting.
Inc., No. 97 C 791, 1997 WL 613021 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29. 1997) Bucci does not fit these categories because
it involved an alleged infringer using a mark to cnticize the trademark ossner In that sense. it is more akin
to trademark dilution cases, in which the unauthonzed use of a mark results in the "tarnishment" or
"blurring" of the mark regardless of the existence of a "likelihood of confusion " Mead Data Cent. Inc
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particular facts, courts must look elsewhere for an approach to solving these
disputes. For example, judges might defer to legislatures rather than apply an
old law to technologies its drafters could not have foreseen.' Alternatively,
both the judicial and legislative branches could look to private industry for
solutions to the problem of cyberspace confusion.
Technological solutions often do a better job of solving intellectual
property problems than legal institutions could ever hope to do.35 Of course,
it is impossible to predict the path of technology; one can only speculate.
Perhaps a better and more expansive universal directory system could be
developed to allow a user to jump directly from a directory to his or her Web
site of choice.36 Alternatively, the system of "digital signatures,"37 developed
to authenticate Web sites for online commerce, could be harnessed to verify
the authorship of noncommercial content so that users could immediately
determine whether a site is indeed what it purports to be.3"
Courts need to recognize that ad hoc decisionmaking is not the best way
to design public policy for emerging technologies. To achieve the proper
balance of property rights and incentives for innovation, judges and legislators
alike must be willing to defer to the already flourishing "virtual community"
to select the appropriate means for solving problems.39 In the absence of
judicial direction, market-driven industry-oriented approaches are bound to
emerge to address online problems in an efficient and effective way.
-Jon H. Oram
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989). Judge Wood was prepared to
apply the federal dilution statute, see Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *6, but because she found sufficient
likelihood of confusion to find trademark infringement, there was no need to do so, see id. at *10.
34. For example, the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts were both undertaken in response to revolutionary
technological advances. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR.
L. REv. 275, 282 (1989) (discussing Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075
(repealed 1976); Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1994))). Similarly, Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (Supp. 11995)), in part due to the difficulties
in applying traditional infringement law to domain disputes. See 141 CONG. REC. S19,312 (daily ed. Dec.
29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (announcing his hope that the Act would "help stem the use of
deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products
and reputations of others"); see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., No. C96-13OWD,
1996 WL 84853 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996) (fulfilling Leahy's desire).
35. There are numerous examples of this phenomenon. For instance, in the 1980s, manufacturers
developed computer programs designed to prevent illegal in-home copying of software. See Vault Corp.
v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 752 (E.D. La. 1987). More recently, Web site operators have
begun to embed identifying information in nontextual works-particularly images and sounds-to allow
them to track copyright violations across the Internet. This process is known as steganography. See Trotter
Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 248.
36. See Nathenson, supra note 24, at 986-87.
37. See Hardy, supra note 35, at 244-45.
38. See Kunsch, supra note 26, at 760-61. A few states have passed digital signature acts to establish
authorities that will issue "certificates" to verify the authenticity of online information. See. e.g., CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 16.5 (West Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 282.70 to .75 (Harrison Supp. 1996).
39. Marchant, supra note 4, at 500. Marchant defines the "virtual community" as an arrangement in
which consumers, online providers, and governmental bodies work together to develop an integrated, cost-
benefit approach that considers the impact of each player's role on the overall system. See id. at 501.
